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1. INTRODUCTION
In “Speech acts, fallacies and dialogue systems”, Olena Yaskorska presents the
guidelines of a model of dialogical logic aimed at grappling with both formal and
informal fallacies. This model results from the integration of two traditions within
formal approaches to dialogue models: on the one hand, Lorenzen’s dialogical logic,
and on the other, Prakken’s formal systems for persuasion dialogue. The aim of
Yaskorska’s project is to provide a formal framework for analyzing real moves
within argumentative dialogues, which is something that, in her view, Prakken’s
model is able to do, while preserving participant’s ability to assess the justificatory
force of their arguments, which is something that, in her view Lorenzen’s model is
able to do.
My main worry about Yaskorska’s project is precisely the latter claim,
namely, that Lorenzen’s model is adequate to determine the justificatory force of
arguments. I will present two qualms: a general one having to do, mainly, with
Lorenzen’s achievements, and a particular one concerning Yaskorska’s actual
proposal.
2. A GENERAL CONCERN
Yaskorska agrees with van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) that an adequate
model of argumentative dialogue must be able to deal with the way in which, in
actual exchanges, the antagonist may challenge not only the premises that the
protagonist has used, but also their justificatory force. Indeed, Pragma-dialectics’s
rule 6b, says that the antagonist may always attack a point of view by questioning
either the propositional content or the justificatory force of the protagonist’s
argument.
As Yaskorska observes, by itself, this rule does not say anything about the
way in which such a challenge is to be handled. In her words:
The pragma-dialectical system requires that the protagonist uses rules of some logic
to defend his reasoning, but it does not provide a formal account of dialogues
(Yaskorska, 2013: nn)
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However, as a criticism against Pragma-dialectics, this observation results a
bit hasty and paradoxical at the same time: as it is well-known, Pragma-dialectics
adopted precisely Lorenzen’s dialogical logic – and in particular, its development by
Barth & Krabbe (1982) – as a framework for determining the logical validity of the
arguments employed by any of the parties.
For my part, I have doubts on whether Lorenzen’s model is a good
instrument for testing the validity of everyday arguments, that is, arguments in
which ordinary connectives have the usual truth-functional interpretation that
allows monological assessments, instead of the constructivist interpretation that
Lorenzen proposes. I will not get into this issue here, but just point out that, if this is
a problem for Pragma-dialectics, it is also a problem for Yaskorska’s overall project.
On the other hand, checking validity as conceived by classical logic is not the
same as checking justificatory force. Actually, it is not the same as checking
inferential goodness. For the truth is that non-deductive and non-formal inferences,
which, at first sight, seem to be predominant in everyday argumentation, get very
poor assessments within classical models. And in this respect, Pragma-dialectics
would be better equipped to assess the justificatory force of the reasons adduced by
any of the parties in an argumentative dialogue. After all, Pragma-dialectics states
both a validity rule and an argument scheme rule prescribing that:
1) Validity rule
A party may only use arguments in its argumentation that are logically valid or
capable of being made logically valid by making explicit one or more unexpressed
premises.
2) Argument scheme rule
A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defense does
not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly
applied. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004).

That is, regarding the assessment of the justificatory force of reasons
constituting different types of defeasible inferences, Lorenzen’s logic has nothing on
offer, apart from the trivial strategy of turning the corresponding arguments into
enthymemes. Contrastingly, Pragma-dialectics has the resource of considering
whether or not an adequate argument schema has been correctly applied. Thus, it
seems that Pragma-dialectics would have already achieved that which seems to be
the main goal of Yaskorska’s project, namely, to provide a model for the assessment
of everyday argumentative exchanges, able to integrate the conception of logical
validity that underlies Lorenzen’s proposal –i.e., a conception according to which
classical logical calculus (or something close to it) results from the rules that
determine the type of moves that a proponent and an opponent in a dialogue may
make, while dealing with other types of justificatory force that premises are able to
confer to standpoints, namely, the justificatory force that results from the correct
utilization of adequate argument schemas. And Pragma-dialectics would do this in
the framework of a speech-act conception of argumentation. So, where would the
gain in Yaskorska’s project respecting Pragma-dialectics?
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I guess that a response could be: Yaskorska’s model is fully formal, something
tractable in a highly systematic way. On the contrary, there is no computable model
for Pragma-dialectics. But, is this a real gain? After all, we cannot deal in a purely
recursive way with actual speech-acts. Interpreting and analyzing actual speech-acts
and argumentative moves in terms of the elements of a particular formal model
does not seem straightforward or systematic either. For even if we think of
argumentative speech-acts in terms of the conditions and consequences of making
certain moves in a dialogue, which is Prakken’s conception of argumentative
speech-acts and also Yaskorska’s, the question of determining whether a particular
move is answerable to this or that norm –that is, the question of determining which
type of speech-act has taken place- is a matter of heuristics and interpretation. (Not
to mention the question of dealing with non-literal and indirect speech-acts and all
its rhetorical implications for the adjudication of a persuasive dialogue).
But this is too broad a criticism for my part; so broad indeed as to suspect
that there is some talking past each other going on here. So let me consider now a
very, very particular worry.
3. YASKORSKA’S ACTUAL PROPOSAL
Of course, Yaskorska’s presentation here is only a sketch of her overall project, and
many details of her actual proposal remain to be explained. For example, we may
wonder how is relevance and consistency of particular moves to be assessed: is it at
the level of the rules for dialogues themselves –so that, for example, it is not
permitted to claim the opposite of something which is already in your own
commitment store or something that is not already in one of the parties’
commitment store- or at the level of parties themselves –so that, for example, there
is a resolve move that prescribes, for each party, solving its own inconsistencies or
withdrawing irrelevancies. Also, we may wonder whether the rules are sensible to
presumptions and burden of proofs, and which are the norms determining how
turns must switch.
These are details that remain to be clarified, but I see no reason why they
couldn’t. Yet, a main problem remains in this presentation. Because Lorenzen
interprets disjunction, that is, “alternative” AvB as a move to be attacked by
questioning whether AvB and to be defended by putting forward A or by putting
forward B, Yaskorska constructs the speech act of argumentation for a disjunction in
Prakken’s model this way:
(L3) Argumentation φ since ψ is performed when a player defends AvB , then φ is a
formula AvB and ψ is a set which includes the formula A or the formula B.
(Yaskorska, 2013: p. 5)

Thus, in her account, defending a disjunction from an attack “why φ”, where
φ is a sentence AvB is modelled by argumentative act “φ since ψ”, where φ is a
disjunction and ψ is a sentence A or sentence B.
However, this way of modelling the defence of a disjunctive formula does
seem too demanding: it might be the case that the proponent is not in a position to
3
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defend any of the disjuncts but only the disjunction as a whole. Think for example of
cases in which the disjunction is a tautology: we may be unable to defend that it will
rain or to defend that it will not rain, but we may be able to defend that it will either
rain or not rain.
4. CONCLUSION
Yaskorska’s paper is the presentation of an ambitious and innovative project. Due to
obvious limitations of space, this presentation can only be a sketch, so that many
questions remain to be clarified. Nevertheless, her presentation enables us to
understand the sort of concerns that she aims to address. In this comments, I have
just tried to suggest that Lorenzen’s model might not be a good basis for this
endeavour.
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